Rarely, if ever, do parties contemplating a joint project commit resources without engaging in non-binding discussions on who does what. Here we argue that such noncommittal discussions may be essential to complete a joint project. We make this point by identifying an interesting class of situations where the private information of the two parties is such that, absent prior discussions, the project is never undertaken. However, with a prior stage of communication, all ex-ante and interim efficient equilibria exhibit a simple structure besides leading to the project's completion with a positive probability. What is more, the equilibrium outcome that maximizes the sum of players' ex-ante welfare is curiously egalitarian -whenever the project is completed, each party contributes toward exactly half the cost, independent of her private information.
(ITER) program to demonstrate the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion energy began as an initiative between the US and Russia as early as 1985. It took over three years before formal collaboration began. Serious negotiations for a site for the reactor to reduce the cost of implementation of the program did not take place until 2003. Similarly, the USCAR, a consortium representing a joint research venture between the Big Three automakers did not take shape until 1992, although the initiative goes back to the period following the Cooperative Research Act (1984) by the U.S. Congress 1 .
Our main thesis in this paper is that such noncommittal discussions relaying players' intentions are essential for coordinating actions to realize the joint project. To make this point, we identify an interesting class of situations where the private information of the two parties is such that, absent prior discussions, it necessarily precludes the parties from undertaking the project in any equilibrium. However, with a prior stage of communication, not only is it possible to complete the project, the ex-ante and interim efficient equilibria exhibit a simple and attractive structure. In fact, in the equilibrium that now maximizes the sum of players' ex-ante welfare, the outcome is curiously egalitarian -whenever the project is completed, each party contributes toward exactly half the cost, independent of her private information.
To elaborate, investment choices of two partners who seek to undertake a joint project are modeled as a voluntary contributions game familiar from the literature on the private provision of discrete public goods. The two players simultaneously choose how much to invest in the project, with the knowledge that any investment is foregone even if the project is not completed. The project is completed only if the sum of their investments is at least the fixed (and commonly known) cost k. The incremental benefit from a project's completion to a player is however her private information. A non-binding communication stage precedes the actual investment stage. Our focus throughout is on situations where no one player has an incentive to complete the project on her own.
When any one player cannot complete the project, for neither player to make any investment clearly constitutes an equilibrium of the contribution game. The probability of the project's completion is then zero, an outcome we describe as strongly inefficient. Our our analysis of the contribution game without cheap talk in Section 2, which we expect to be of independent interest, allows us to identify an interesting class of priors, called admissible distributions under which the unique equilibrium is strongly inefficient. We shall describe these results and the concept of admissibility presently.
From Section 3 onwards, we restrict attention to admissible distributions to study the role of cheap talk. The simplified view we take is that the only impression a player takes away from the non-binding discussions is whether the other player is serious about investing a positive amount but not the precise extent of their intended investment. Consequently, the communication can be described using two messages y or n standing for "Yes, I will make an investment" or "No, I will not make a positive contribution" respectively. After a simultaneous exchange of these messages, they choose their contributions as per the voluntary contribution mechanism.
Proposition 4 and Proposition 6 appearing respectively in Section 3 and Section 4, provide a complete characterization of interim-efficient and ex-ante efficient equilibria. Not only do these equilibria result in the project's completion with a positive probability, but it turns out that every interim efficient equilibrium (and hence any ex-ante efficient equilibrium) involves a so called simple strategy profile. In a simple strategy there is a threshold x, such that Player 1 and Player 2 first announce y only if their respective values for the project are at least x and k − x. Following this, the project is undertaken only when both announce y, with Player 1 contributing x and Player 2 contributing the remaining k − x to complete the project. In fact, we characterize the precise range of values of x for which the above is an interim efficient equilibrium strategy and also the subset of those values for which it is also ex-ante efficient. The equilibrium that maximizes the sum of players' ex-ante payoffs, which we refer to as the socially efficient equilibrium, is presented in Proposition 7. When the players' valuations are i.i.d, the socially efficient equilibrium strategy is a simple strategy with the threshold being k/2, i.e. the players share the costs equally whenever the project is completed.
We now return to the concept of admissible priors. Section 2 studies the base case without prior communication. Proposition 1 contains a simple necessary and sufficient condition that the priors must satisfy for the existence of an equilibrium in which the project is completed with a positive probability.An interesting consequence of this result is a sufficient condition on the prior distributions, presented as Proposition 2, by which the unique equilibrium is strongly inefficient. In the case of unimodal prior distributions, this sufficient condition for strong inefficiency is that the sum of the modes is less than the cost k. For unimodal distibutions, admissiblity is only somewhat stronger than the requirement that the sum of the modes is less than the cost. The precise condition we use is stated in terms of an extension of the mode that we call the pseudo-mode and can be checked easily for arbitrary continuous distributions.
Results in relation to the literature
There is a large literature on the implications of pre-play communication in games. With regard to information transmission, this can be broadly classified into two. The first, beginning with Farrell (1988 Farrell ( , 1993 , essentially concerns equilibrium selection. Cheap talk renders only certain kinds of beliefs at out of equilibrium information sets "credible". This in turn rules out some of the equilibria as being plausible. A recent contribution in this line of research is Baliga and Morris (August 2002) , and we refer the reader to the discussion in Section 2 of their paper regarding this line of research. There is no significant relationship of the present work to this line of thought.
The second class of papers, starting from Crawford and Sobel (November 1982) , Green and Stokey (198.) , is concerned with how cheap talk expands the set of equilibria. Our work falls into this class. Among such works, this paper is closest in spirit to that of Farrell and Gibbons (June 1989) and Matthews and Postlewaite (June 1989) who discuss the implications of cheap talk in bilateral trading problems where the trading mechanism is the k-double auction. The former study introduces a stage of prior communication in the well known double auction of Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) Chatterjee and Samuelson when k = 1/2. The latter study takes this analysis further and draws a strong (and surprising) conclusion that equilibrium outcomes are independent of the parameter k in the k-double auction. However, neither of these works discuss the efficiency properties of cheap talk and therefore it is not possible to compare our results with theirs.
A recent and interesting variation on the theme of cheap talk expanding the set of equilibria is due to Aumann and Hart (2002) and Krishna and Morgan (2002) . They show how repeated rounds of communication can often lead to increased efficiency. We take up this issue briefly in Section 5.1 in the special case where the two players' valuations are independent draws from the same distribution. We then argue that the socially efficient equilibrium involving the equal sharing of the costs is robust in the sense that switching to any equilibrium of the game with added communication possibilities makes a generic set of types strictly worse off. In fact, some examples suggest the even overall welfare, measured as the sum of players' utilities also cannot increase -the social efficiency of egalitarian cost sharing of simple communication is robust to additional communication possibilities.
Our results in Section 2 also contribute to a large literature on the private provision of public goods using a voluntary contribution scheme. Much of that literature differs from the version we study in Section 2 as it is done under complete information. An exception is Menezes, Monteiro, and Temimi (July 2001). They do not consider the role of cheap talk. Even otherwise, our informational assumptions are more general and the results sharper.
In this paper, the role of cheap talk is to enhance efficiency. This effect is quite stark in the contribution game that we study largely because any contribution is sunk. One can of course imagine situations where contributions are contingent on the project being completed, i.e. contributions are refundable. Sometimes these are referred to as "subscription games" in the literature. With two players however, a subscription game can be seen to be formally equivalent to a bilateral trading situation. The implication of preplay communication in such cases can therefore be obtained from the conclusions drawn in Farrell and Gibbons (June 1989) and Matthews and Postlewaite (June 1989) . Particularly when it is not possible to make contributions contingent on a project's completion, to offset the risk of forgoing contributions, in reality individuals contribute in small increments as well as engaging in non-binding negotiations. In our model, players implicitly commit to contributing only once. This highlights the role of negotiations. A more general model which allows players to make incremental contributions as well would be of interest. The model of Admati and Perry (April 1991) which allows sequential contributions but has neither cheap talk nor incomplete information may be a useful starting point. (See also Marx and Matthews (April 2000) .)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we begin to study the voluntary contributions mechanism. Section 3 describes and characterizes the interim efficient equilibria when the above game is modified by appending a prior stage of pre-play communication. Section 4 takes this analysis further by characterizing the ex-ante efficient equilibria and also contains the result on the egalitarian split. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of the robustness of our results and future work. Of particular interest may be Section 5.1 which discusses the effects of repeated communication.
The Contribution Game
A joint project between two partners requires a total investment of k > 0 for completion. For i = 1, 2, if Player i contributes an amount c i in total, her payoff is v i − c i if the project is completed and −c i otherwise. The players simultaneously choose how much to contribute in a Cournot fashion. The project is undertaken only if the sum of their contributions is at least k. The salient feature that deserves emphasis is that contributions are not refundable, even if the project is not completed.
The above procedure by which players make choices is often referred to as the voluntary contributions mechanism in the literature on threshold public goods. We differ from much of that literature by assuming that the benefit v i is the private information of Player i while the other maintains a prior that it is a random draw from a distribution F i whose support is an interval [v i , v i ]. We shall assume throughout the paper that F i admits a continuous density f i . We denote the game of incomplete information that is naturally induced by the above procedure by C(F 1 , F 2 ). By an equilibrium we mean a Bayesian equilibrium of this game.
There are two notable assumptions implicit in the above description of the environment. First, the values of the players are independently distributed. This is an important restriction. Correlation among types warrants a separate analysis. Second, the benefit from not undertaking the project is normalized to zero. Therefore v i is the minimum incremental benefit from completing the project for Player i. We assume that this is non-negative.
To keep the problem interesting, we also assume that v 1 + v 2 > k so that there are valuations for which it is ex-post efficient to complete the project. A more substantive restriction is our focus throughout to situations where no one player has an incentive to complete the project on her own. Accordingly we assumē
(1)
Definition 1 (Strongly Inefficient Equilibrium). An equilibrium in which the project is not undertaken regardless of the players' valuations is said to be a strongly inefficient equilibrium.
As each player is uncertain of the contribution of the other player, (1) is enough to ensure that a strongly inefficient equilibrium exists. To see this recall that a strategy specifies a contribution as a function of a player's type. If one player does not contribute regardless of her type, then unless the second player contributes an amount greater than her highest valuation, the project is not completed. Consequently, the best response for the second player is not to make a contribution. The upshot is that the project is never completed.
Given the above, we can ask what conditions on the underlying priors will admit an equilibrium in which the project is completed, at least sometimes if not always. A priori, given the potential for highly complex equilibrium strategies, this would seem difficult. However there is a natural starting point to gain some intuition. That is, one could begin by asking under what conditions a so called cost sharing equilibrium exists.
In a cost sharing equilibrium, for i = 1, 2, there is a threshold v i ∈ [v i , v i ) such that Player i contributes a constant x i if her type is at least v i and zero otherwise, where x 1 + x 2 = k. For this to be an equilibrium clearly 0 < x i < k, and since no one player has an incentive to complete the project and the contributions are not refundable, the probability of completing the project is positive. The next lemma offers a simple necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a cost sharing equilibrium. First define
Lemma 1. C(F 1 , F 2 ) admits a cost sharing equilibrium if and only if
(2)
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose a cost sharing equilibrium exists with (v 1 , v 2 ) being the tuple of marginal types and (x 1 , x 2 ) the respective shares of the cost. The expected payoff of type v i from contributing
Being the marginal type, she must weakly prefer contributing x i to not making a positive contribution, an action that results in a zero payoff. H(v 1 , v 2 ) ≥ k is then merely the implication that the sum of these payoffs is non-negative.
Conversely, suppose (2) holds. Assume without loss of generality 2 that the inequality is in fact binding for some (v 1 , v 2 ). Then define x i = (1 − F j (v j ))v i and conclude that only types v i and above making a positive contribution of x i , for i = 1, 2, constitutes a cost sharing equilibrium.
As it turns out, cost sharing equilibria are more than just a starting point in our search for a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium probability of the project's completion to be positive. The following proposition makes this precise.
Proposition 1. C(F 1 , F 2 ) has an equilibrium in which the project is completed with a positive probability if and only if it admits a cost sharing equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The formal proof is in the Appendix. The following is a rough intuition. From (1), we know that the highest contribution of either player is bounded away from k. Consequently, the lowest positive contribution of either player must be bounded away from zero. For this to happen in equilibrium, even the smallest contribution must imply a positive probability that the project is completed. Otherwise the type making that contribution obtains a negative profit. But this probability can only be positive if there is a mass of types at the top end of the distribution that contribute a constant amount. This in turn implies that there is a mass of types at the lower end of the distribution who also contribute a constant amount. Roughly speaking, H(v 1 , v 2 ) corresponds to the sum of expected benefits of the highest type among the mass at the lower end of Player 1's distribution and the lowest type among the mass at the upper end of Player 2's distribution, which is then shown to be at least k.
Proposition 1 is a useful tool that allows us to obtain the remaining two results of this section by placing more structure on the priors. These results, which may be of independent interest, play a key role in our analysis when we allow for pre-play communication in the subsequent sections. The key characteristic of the priors in terms of which the results are stated is defined below.
Definition 2 (Pseudo-mode). The pseudo-mode of a distribution F is the smallest x such that the density f is non-increasing everywhere to the right of x. Let µ denote the pseudomode of a distribution.
Occasionally we say a player is a pseudo-modal type if her valuation is µ.
Although the concept of pseudo-mode is new, it is closely aligned to the notion of the mode of a distribution. For instance when the distribution is uni-modal, the density is increasing everywhere to the left and decreasing everywhere to the right of the unique mode. In this case the mode is the same as the pseudo-mode. That the two concepts are different can be seen by considering the uniform distribution. The mode is no longer unique. Yet, since the density is a constant, the pseudo-mode is uniquely determined as the lower end of its support.
Proposition 2. Suppose it is ex-post inefficient to complete the project when the players valuations are their pseudo-modes. Then the unique equilibrium of C(F 1 , F 2 ) is strongly inefficient.
The main argument in the proof of Proposition 2 is fairly transparent when F i is concave. Since the pseudo-mode of F i is then v i , the relevant hypothesis in Proposition 2 is that v 1 + v 2 < k. Clearly H is convex since F i is concave. Therefore the maximum value of H is achieved at one of the four corners namely (
The respective values of H at these points are v 1 + v 2 , v 1 , v 2 and 0 which means it is impossible to maintain H(v 1 , v 2 ) ≥ k for any possible tuple (v 1 , v 2 ). By Lemma 1, there does not exist a cost sharing equilibrium. The result then follows from Proposition 1. Conversely, when v 1 + v 2 ≥ k, for Player 1 to contribute v 1 and Player 2 to contribute k − v 1 regardless of their types is clearly a cost sharing equilibrium in which project is completed with probability one.
In fact, when the prior distributions are concave, stronger conclusions can be drawn. First we recall the notion of an interim efficient equilibrium of a Bayesian game. Suppose E denotes a typical Bayesian equilibrium of some game of incomplete information and U E i (v i ) the corresponding equilibrium payoff of type v i .
Definition 3 (Interim Efficient Equilibrium).
An equilibrium E of a Bayesian game is said to be interim efficient if there does not exist another equilibrium, sayÊ of the same game such that UÊ i (v i ) ≥ U E i (v) for all v and for i = 1, 2 with the inequality being strict for a non-generic set of types. Proposition 3. Suppose F i is concave for i = 1, 2. Then the following are true of C(F 1 , F 2 ).
1. If v 1 + v 2 < k, the unique equilibrium is strongly inefficient.
2. If v 1 + v 2 ≥ k, then in any interim efficient equilibrium, the project is completed with probability one.
Cheap Talk and Efficiency
The three propositions in the previous section inform us of a large class of prior distributions that lead to strongly inefficient outcomes. A number of authors have argued that pre-play non-binding communication can help in overcoming inefficiency in other contexts. 3 Even if communication is costless in the sense that it does not directly influence the payoffs, it does expand the set of equilibria by increasing the size of the strategy space. In this section, we explore the extent to which non-binding exchange of information can in this way ameliorate the strong inefficiency in the original contribution game.
Specifically, what we have in mind is a situation where the players discuss various options prior to making independent choices on the level of contribution. The only impression that they take from this meeting is whether the other player is serious about making a positive contribution or not but not her precise valuation as such. Consequently, we shall think of the message space as consisting of exactly two elements y or n standing for "Yes, I will make a positive contribution" or "No, I will not make a positive contribution" respectively. Announcements are simultaneous. After each player observes the other player's message, they choose their contributions as per the voluntary contribution mechanism described in the previous section.
The above procedure may be analyzed, in the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , as a multi-stage game with observed actions and incomplete information. Denote this game as C * (F 1 , F 2 ). By an equilibrium we mean a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). We refer the reader to Chapter 8 of the above book for formal details. More informally, the actions of the two players in the communication stage result in one of four histories, namely {(n, n), (n, y), (y, n), (y, y)}. A player's strategy is to specify an announcement as a function of her type and to specify how much she will contribute as a function of her type and the history. The posterior beliefs after each history should be consistent with the Bayes Rule. A Bayesian equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if given a history and the posterior beliefs, the strategies constitute a Bayesian Equilibrium of the continuation game.
Definition 4 (Admissible Distributions).
A pair of probability distributions (F 1 , F 2 ) is said to be admissible if v j < (k − µ i ), for i = j, i, j = 1, 2 where µ i is the pseudo-mode of F i .
For an admissible pair, it is ex-post inefficient for the highest type of one player and the pesudo-modal type of the other player to undertake the project. By Proposition 2, this condition is sufficient to ensure that the equilibrium without cheap talk is necessarily strongly inefficient. It is precisely these situations where the original outcome is inefficient that one might expect cheap talk to lead to better outcomes, mainly through better coordination.
Even with preplay communication, one cannot necessarily expect a more efficient outcome. After all, there is always a "babbling equilibrium" in which regardless of the history of announcements, the players coordinate on the strongly inefficient equilibrium of the continuation game. Since it is always an equilibrium for both players to contribute zero, there need be no further discussion with regard to the beliefs to conclude that the above strategy profile can be supported as an equilibrium.
In view of the above, one has to engage in some selection of equilibria. One constraint we impose is that the strategies satisfy a weak convexity criterion at the communication stage: If two different types of a player report y at the communication stage, then all the types intermediate between them also report y. Second, our interest is in equilibria that are not Pareto-dominated according to the the criterion of interim utility. Our main result will show that all interim efficient equilibria of C * (F 1 , F 2 ) have the following appealing structure.
Definition 5 (Simple Strategy Profile of C * (F 1 , F 2 )). A strategy profile is said to be a simple strategy profile, denoted by E(x), if there exists a cutoff x such that 1. At the communication stage
• Player 1 announces y only if her type is at least x
• Player 2 announces y only if her type is at least k − x 2. At the contribution stage, neither player makes a positive contribution unless both have previously announced y. If both have said y then
• Player 1 contributes x if her type is at least x.
• Player 2 contributes k − x if her type is at least k − x
The main result of this section is as follows.
The above proof in the Appendix is purely algebraic and relies on above Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. The main idea can be seen quite simply in terms of the following pictures in the case when F i = F where F is concave and v i = 0.
The original state space is described as a quadrangle with the valuation of Player 1 on the horizontal axis and that of Player 2 on the y axis in each of the diagrams in Figure 1 . One the negatively sloped dashed line the sum of players' valuations sum to k.
If Player i chooses to announce y beyond a cutoff a i , following the exchange of the messages, it becomes common-knowledge (along the equilibrium path) that their valuations lie in one of the four quadrants A, B 1 , B 2 or C. That is, they play the original contribution game with the state space being one of these quadrants. These four quadrants respectively correspond to the histories (n, n), (n, y), (y, n) and (y, y).
In the quadrant A, the sum of the lowest possible valuations is 2v < k. For i = 1, 2, in the quadrant B i , the sum of the lowest possible valuations is a i < k. By Part 1 of Proposition 3, it is immediate that the unique equilibrium of the continuation game following the histories is strongly inefficient. Therefore, if at all the project is completed with a positive probability, it occurs following both players reporting y.
. a 1 and a 2 add to less than k. The strongly inefficient equilibrium is unique.
. a 1 and a 2 sum to k. The simple strategy E(a 1 ) results in the project being completed in the entire quadrangle C.
. a 1 and a 2 sum to at least k and the project is completed in a strict subset of C, shaded black. Following the history (y, y) however, it becomes common-knowledge that their types are in the quadrangle C. There are three situations to consider, depending on whether the sum of the cutoffs a 1 and a 2 is less than k, equals k or is more than k. We take these up in sequence.
If a 1 + a 2 < k, the situation is as in shown in Figure 1a . The sum of the lowest possible valuations of the quadrangle C is also less than k. Again, from Part 1 of Proposition 3, the unique equilibrium is strongly inefficient.
If a 1 +a 2 = k, the situation is as shown in Figure 1b and for Player i to contribute a i if she had reported y is clearly an equilibrium of the continuation game. The project is therefore completed when the valuations lie in the shaded region, which is the entire region C. For this to constitute an equilibrium of the overall game, the marginal type a i must be indifferent from reporting y or n. This clearly is the case since her payoff is zero with both reports. In other words, we have argued that the simple strategy E(a 1 ) is an equilibrium.
Finally, consider the situation where a 1 + a 2 ≥ k and the players coordinate on some equilibrium whereby the project is completed in some sub-region of the quadrangle C such as say the black square of Figure 1c . We can then compare this with a equilibrium where Player 2 reduces her cutoff from a 2 to k − a 1 instead so that they play the simple strategy E(a 1 ). The consequence is that the project will be completed in the entire region shaded gray in Figure 1c , which includes the black square. It is well known that the equilibrium payoffs depend only on the equilibrium probability of allocation. Therefore, under E(a 1 ) some of the types are strictly better off relative the original equilibrium.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the criterion of admissibility. Firstly, how strong is the assumption of admissibility? If priors are symmetric and convex, such as the truncated Pareto distribution, then the pseudomode is also the highest valuation and clearly they would not be admissible. On the other hand, if the priors are (weakly) concave, as in the case of the uniform distribution or appropriately truncated normal distribution, then the pseudomode is the lowest type v i . Recall that v i , is the smallest incremental benefit from the project's completion. If there are types of players who do not value the project "very much", in which case v i is sufficiently close to zero, then admissibility is virtually (1), which one may recall is the condition that no one player has an incentive to complete the project on her own.
Secondly it is possible to construct counter examples 4 to Proposition 4 if admissibility is violated. In fact, as the following proposition shows, for concave distributions, admissibility is not only a sufficient condition for only simple strategies to be interim efficient, as asserted by Proposition 4, it is in fact also necessary.
Proposition 5. Suppose the valuations of both the players are identically distributed according to a concave distribution F . Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. An interim efficient equilibrium is a simple strategy.
(F, F ) is admissible.
Interestingly, Proposition 5 is a characterization of concave priors in terms of admissbility and interim efficiency of the simple strategies. The main arguments behind the formal proof can be illustrated in terms of a couple of diagrams. When the distribution F is concave, saying that (F, F ) is not admissible is equivalent to
Assuming (3) we construct an equilibrium E * such that the project is completed only in the shaded regions of Figure 2b . Note that a simple strategy can be supported as an equilibrium even when admissibility is violated. Under a simple strategy E(x), the region in which the project is completed when the valuations lie in the north east region shaded in Figure 2a .
. Project is completed in the shaded region under E * Observe that in both cases, the outcome is ex-post efficient. It is also evident that regardles of the choice of x, it is impossible to contain the shaded region of Figure 2a within the shaded region of Figure 2b or vice versa. Therefore, E * and E(x) are not comparable in terms of interim efficiency.
Ex-ante Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing
In this section, we study the relation between different equilibria of C * (F 1 , F 2 ) in terms of exante efficiency: that is we rank equilibria according to the Pareto criterion using the expected payoff of a player before she finds out her type.
It is well-known that ex-ante efficiency implies interim efficiency. Therefore in our search for ex-ante efficient equilibria, it suffices to restrict attention to the set of interim efficient equilibria. From Proposition 4 we know that an interim efficient equilibrium of C * (F 1 , F 2 ) is a simple strategy E(x). Therefore, the search for ex-ante efficient equilibria can be restricted to a Pareto ranking of the different simple strategies.
An equilibrium that is interim efficient can yet fail to be ex-ante efficient. This is because the change in the ex-ante payoff from E(x) resulting from a change in x could be either positive or negative. Although a higher x means that Player 1 pays more for the project, it may increase the likelihood of the project's completion. Conversely for Player 2. Since the outcome is always ex-post efficient in any simple strategy, this trade off is likely to make Player i prefer intermediate values of x. The ex-ante expected payoffs under E(x) of the players are
Definition 6 (Ex-ante Efficient Equilibrium). E(x) is said to be ex-ante efficient if there does not exist ax in the interval [k − v 2 , v 1 ] such that W i (x) ≥ W i (x) for i = 1, 2 with the inequality being strict for at least one player. Figure 3 plots the functions W 1 (·) and W 2 (·) for the case when F i is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 and k = 1.15. These functions achieve a maximum at x * 1 and x * 2 respectively and therefore the ex-ante payoff of Player i is the highest under the simple strategy E(x * i ). As these functions are single peaked and x * 1 < x * 2 , an equilibrium E(x) for values of x lying to the left of x * 1 or to the right of x * 2 cannot be ex-ante efficient. In fact, the above structure is more general. We say that distribution F i is regular is
Proposition 6. Suppose (F 1 , F 2 ) is an admissible pair and for i = 1, 2, F i is regular. The function W i (·) has a unique maximum, x * i and x * 1 < x * 2 . An equilibrium of the the cheap talk game is ex-ante efficient if and only if it is a simple strategy E(x), for every x in the interval [x * 1 , x * 2 ]
The main element of the proof of the above proposition is to show that W i (·) has a unique maximum x * i and that x * 1 < x * 2 . We can then conclude that to the left of x * 1 and to the right 5 This is just the monotone likelihood ratio property that is well known in the theory of incentives.
of x * 2 both W 1 (·) and W 2 (·) are decreasing. Therefore for any x drawn from this range, E(x) is Pareto dominated either by E(x * 1 ) or E(x * 2 ). In the region [x * 1 , x * 2 ] however, W 1 (·) is increasing while W 2 (·) is decreasing. Therefore, for any x =x drawn from this interval, E(x) does not Pareto dominate E(x). Therefore E(x) is ex-ante efficient whenever x lies in [x * 1 , x * 2 ]. Thus far we have only used the Pareto principle to rank equilibria. We now consider the following utilitarian social choice rule.
Definition 7 (Socially Efficient Eequilibrium). The socially efficient equilibrium maximizes the sum of players' ex-ante utilities among all equilibria.
Note that a socially efficient equilibrium is necessarily ex-ante efficient. Thus, in view of Proposition 6, to find a socially efficient equilibrium, it suffices to maximize the function W 1 (x) + W 2 (x), the sum of the two players payoffs under the simple strategy profile E(x) where x lies in the interval [x * 1 , x * 2 ]. Define
Proposition 7. Suppose (F 1 , F 2 ) is an admissible pair and F i is regular. Then the socially efficient equilibrium is the simple strategy profile E(x * ) where x = x * is the unique solution to ψ 1 (x) = ψ 2 (k − x).
Corollary 1. In addition to the assumptions of Proposition 7, suppose F 1 = F 2 . Then E(k/2) is the socially efficient equilibrium.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that H i (·) is a decreasing function and when the priors are the same
That is when the valuations are identically distributed, the socially efficient equilibrium has an egalitarian characteristic: whenever the project is undertaken, each player contributes k/2 which is half the cost. Example 1. This is an example to show that it is not possible to discard the assumption that F is regular. Suppose F is the following piecewise linear function on [0, 1]:
As the slope of F decreases from 1.5 to 0.2, it is indeed concave. Assume k = 1. Direct computation shows that the social surplus in E(1/2) is .21875 while under E(0.45) and E(0.55) the social surplus is 0.2270. However, direct computation shows that (1 − F (0.5)) 2 = 0.0625 whereas (1−F (0.4))(1−F (0.6)) = 0.680. Therefore, the PBE in which one player contributes 60% of the costs while the other contributes the remaining 40% leads to a greater ex-ante probability of trade.
Discussion

Repeated Communication
Assume that the hypotheses of Proposition 4 are satisfied. Consider the continuation game following a history where one player reports y and the other player reports n in an interim efficient equilibrium. The revised beliefs are such that the players' types lie in either region B 1 or B 2 , in terms of the Figure 1b . Observe that the continuation game, given the posterior beliefs is similar to the original game (which is the reason that the unique equilibrium is strongly inefficient). Just as an exchange of messages lead to improved efficiency in the original game, it is clear that if players were to converse again, it may lead to the the project completion and a Pareto improvement.
While the above intuition suggest that additional communication possibilities may help, there is also a counter argument that if players were to anticipate such future conversation, they may be less forthcoming in the initial rounds. It is a natural question whether it is possible to dominate the interim-efficient equilibria of Proposition 4 if players initially anticipate an additional round of communication.
Our effort to study the situation in which there is no a priori bound on the rounds of communication indicate that such an analysis is quite intricate 6 . However, when both palyers have the same prior, we show that the possibility of an additional round of communication does not Pareto improve upon the outcomes under the socially efficient equilibrium with one round of communication.
We introduce an additional round of communication stage as follows. The two players exchange messages. If both agree by saying y, they play the voluntary contribution game. If at least one of them reports n, then they exchange a further round of messages. The game then ends with a play of the contribution game. We shall denote this game by C 2 (F 1 , F 2 ).
Proposition 8. Suppose the values of the two players are identically distributed according to a regular F . Also assume that (F, F ) is admissible. In any symmetric equilibrium of C 2 (F, F ), the equilibrium payoffs of a non-generic set of types is strictly less than their corresponding payoffs in the socially efficient equilibrium of C * (F, F ).
Proposition 8 shows that an additional round of communication does not improve on the interim efficiency of the socially efficient equilibrium obtained through one round of communication. A natural question is whether some improvement can be achieved in terms of ex-ante efficiency. Even with two rounds of communication, the analysis appears intractable. Numerical computations for particular parameter values suggest that the socially efficient equilibrium with one round of communication continues to be socially efficient when an additional round of communication is possible 7 .
A general analysis of repeated communication is a possible avenue for future research.
Multiple Simultaneous Messages
In Section 3 we had deliberately constrained players to choose from two messages. One could think of a more general two stage procedure. In stage one, the two players simultaneously make a single announcement, which is an element m taken a shared language M, henceforth refered to as the message space. Following this, they play the contribution game. Assume that M contains more than two elements. We will denote this multistage game of incomplete information by G (F 1 , F 2 ) .
In any strategy, a player's action at the announcement stage can be regarded as a tuple (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n−1 ), which is a strictly increasing sequence drawn from the open interval (v 1 , v 1 ). The interpretation is that she chooses the message m 1 if her type lies in the interval [v 1 , a 1 ), the message m n if her type is in the interval [a n−1 , v 1 ] and the message m i when her type is drawn from [a i−1 , a i ), for i = 2 . . . n − 1. Likewise, we will denote the choice of Player 2 as a tuple (b 1 , . . . , b n−1 ).
An analogue of Proposition 4 can be obtained if we insist on interim efficiency at every continuation game.
Definition 8 (Posterior Efficiency
). An equilibrium is said to be posterior efficient if its restriction to the contribution game following the communication stage is interim efficient, given the posterior beliefs.
We will let PEE denote a posterior efficient equilibrium.
Proposition 9. Suppose (F 1 , F 2 ) is an admissible pair. Let {(a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ), (b 1 , . . . , b n−1 )} be the actions chosen at the communication stage in a PEE. In the continuation game following a history (a i , b j ), 1. if a i−1 + b j−1 ≥ k, the project is completed with probability one and 2. if a i−1 + b j−1 < k, the project is not undertaken.
Proof. At the node (a i , b j ), the game being played is C(F 1 ,F 2 ) whereF 1 is the truncation of
. If a i ≤ µ i , then the pesudo-mode of F 1 is µ 1 . Consequently, the sum of the pesudo-modes of the posteriors is bounded above by µ 1 + v 2 . By Proposition 2 the unique equilibrium of C(F 1 ,F 2 ) is strongly inefficient. Similarly if b j ≤ µ 2 the conclusion follows.
Assume then a i ≥ µ 1 and b j ≥ µ 2 . In this case, bothF 1 andF 2 are concave. Apply Proposition 3 to conclude that the project can be completed with probability one if a i +b j ≥ k and with probability zero otherwise.
More than two players
Certain extensions of our results to n players are immediate. One can develop an analogue of Proposition 1 along the following line by restricting attention to a class of equilibria that are continuous in a certain sense. If F i is the prior distribution of Player i's valuation. Given a vector of valuations V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), a coalition 8 S and i ∈ S, define A i (V, S) as the probability of the event that the valuation of any other Player j ∈ S is at least v j . Then define
Now suppose (C 1 , . . . , C n ) is an equilibrium strategy profile such that Player i's strategy C i (·) satisfies the following continuity property: The restriction of the C i (·) to the set of types of Player i contribute a positive amount is continuous. Remark 1 following the proof of Proposition 1 can be extended to conclude that the existence of a V and a coalition S such that H(V, S) ≥ k is a necessary and sufficient condition for project to be completed with a positive probability in equilibrium.
The role of cheap talk with more than two players is substantially more complicated than the analysis presented in Section 3. This is because several different coalitions may be able to complete the project following the initial round of communication 9 .
We expect to study the situation involving n players in a companion paper.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (C 1 , C 2 ) be a equilibrium in which the project is completed with a positive probability, where
is the equilibrium contribution of type v i . It suffices to show that there exists (v * 1 , v * 2 ) at which (2) holds. First suppose there exists a tuple (v 1 ,v 2 ) such that
We shall show presently that such a tuple must must exist. Then for i = 1, 2, define the sets
which must be non-negative. The infimum of this expression must also be non-negative, which is to say
(8) and (9) together show that Eq. (2) holds at (v * 1 , v * 2 ). To complete the proof, we must exhibit a (v 1 ,v 2 ) such that (8) holds. Pick a typev 1 such that her contribution
Suppose A ∩ B = ∅. It is well known that C i (·) must be non-decreasing in any equilibrium and hence A and B are intervals. Moreover, A ∪ B = [v 2 , v 2 ]. Therefore there must exist 9 If one assumes that n − 1 players can never complete the project, the role of sub-coalitions is ruled out. In such cases a direct extension of Proposition 4 is possible: Say (F1, . . . , Fn) is admissible if j =i vj + µi < k. Then in any interim efficient equilibrium there is a vector (x1, . . . , xn) such that i xi = k and Player i reports y in the communication stage only if her type is at least xi. In any continuation game except the one following every player reporting y, they coordinate on the strongly inefficient outcome. Following an unanimous announcement of y, Player i contributes xi if her valuation is at least as high and the project is completed with probability one. Proof of this statement is a direct extension of that of Proposition 4. F 2 (x) ). If C 2 (x) > k − c 1 , then this probability does not change even if c 1 is reduced by a small amount. Consequently, it cannot be a best response for Player 1 to contribute c 1 . In other words, one must have C 2 (x) = k − c 1 . Takev 2 = x.
A similar argument as above can be applied to show that other configuration for A and B described in (b) above also yeilds a contradiction.
Remark 1. This concerns the claim made in Section 5.3 regarding the the generalization of the above Proposition 1 to the case of more than two players. The additional restriction on the class of equilibria is as follows. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of players and V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) a typical vector of valuations. Let (C 1 , . . . , C n ) be an equilibrium in which the project is completed with a positive probability. As before, C i (·) must be non-decreasing which means that there exists a uniqueṽ i such that
The constraint we impose on the equilibrium is that C i (·) is continuous on [ṽ i , v i ] for all i. Given such an equilibrium, let S ⊆ N denote the set of players who contribute a positive amount with some probability, i.e.ṽ i < v i if i ∈ S.
Assume without loss of generality that 1 ∈ S and pickv 1 such that C 1 (v 1 ) = c 1 > 0. Given a contribution of c from Player 1 the project is completed only if the event E(c) = {V :
Note that there must exist V a ∈ X such that c 1 + i∈S,
(E(c)) = 1 for a c < c 1 and thusv 1 would benefit by lowering her contribution of c 1 in contradiction of the fact that it is an equilibrium contribution. Similarly, there must exist
(E(c 1 )) = 0 and not contributing any positive amount constitutes a profitable deviation forv 1 . Given V a aand V b with the above properties, a routine application of the intermediate value theorem 10 establishes the existence of aV ∈ X such that
Then by virtue of (10), the equilibrium payoff of each
, where A i (V * , S) is as defined in Section 5.3. Taking the infimum over v i ∈ X i gives us
Since equilibrium payoffs must be non-negative and the fact (10) holds yields H(V * , S) ≥ k.
The following lemma is essentially due to Myerson (1981) and is stated without proof.
Lemma 2. Let E be an equilibrium of either C(
Let q E i (v i ) denote the probability that the project will be completed when Player i's type is v i . Then her 10 Look at the function φ(λ) = c1 + i∈S,i =1 Ci(λv
The above lemma is useful for comparing the efficiency properties of various equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2. We will show that under the given hypotheses, H(x 1 , x 2 ) is strictly bounded above by k for all interior points. Lemma 1 implies that cost sharing equilibrium does not exist. Then apply Proposition 1.
First consider the region where x 2 ≥ µ 2 . In this region, F 2 is concave. Therefore for any x 1 , the function H(x 1 , ·) is convex which means its maxima (in the second argument) are one of the two extreme points of this domain, namely µ 2 or v 2 . By (1), H(x 1 , v 2 ) < 0 and hence the maximum is H(x 1 , µ 2 ).
To see that H(x 1 , µ 2 ) is below k, we need to consider two cases depending on whether x 1 ≤ µ 1 or not. Since H(x 1 , µ 2 ) is clearly bounded above by x 1 + µ 2 , when x 1 ≤ µ 1 , it is immediate that the upper bound of H(x 1 , µ 2 ) is µ 1 + µ 2 , which by hypothesis is less than k and the proof is complete. On the other hand if x 1 > µ 1 , the function H(x 1 , µ 2 ) is convex and hence attains its maximum at either H(µ 1 , µ 2 ) or at H(v 1 , µ 2 ). The former is as before bounded above by µ 1 + µ 2 and hence by k. In case of the latter, by (1) H(v 1 , µ 2 ) < k.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the paragraphs prior to the statement of the proposition, we have already discussed how (1) follows as a corollary to Proposition 2.
To prove (2), let E be an equilibrium of C(F 1 , F 2 ) and let q E i (v i ) be the probability that the project is completed when Player i if of type v i . Let c i = C i (v i ) denote the contribution of Player i of the lowest type. A contribution of at least k − c 1 is required from Player 2 to complete the project when Player 1 contributes c 1 . Let C 2 (v 2 ) = c 2 + X(v 2 ). Here X(v 2 ) is the contribution of type v 2 over and above the contribution of (the lowest type) v 2 . Now, the payoff of the lowest type of Player 1 is
Now consider the following strategyÊ: Player 1 contributes k − c 2 , regardless of her type while Player 2 contributes c 2 regardless of her type. Since c 2 ≤ v 2 and therefore v 2 ≥ c 2 for all v 2 . Similarly by the assumption that v 1 + v 2 ≥ k, k − c 2 ≤ v 1 for all v 1 . From this, it is immediate thatÊ is an equilibrium.
In fact, in the above equilibrium,
, which by (11) is at least U E 1 (v 1 ). As Player 2 of type v 2 continues to contribute the same amount c 2 while the probability of the project's completion is now one, clearly,
for all v i , with the inequality being strict for some types if q E i (v i ) < 1 for some v i .
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 4. For the sake of clarity, we break it into several lemmas. It is worth noting that admissibility of (F 1 , F 2 ) is not necessary to support E(x) as an equilibrium strategy profile.
Lemma 3. For every x ∈ (k − v 2 , v 1 ), the simple strategy profile E(x) can be supported as an equilibrium strategy profile.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let the posterior beliefs at the contribution stage after every history to be those obtained through Bayesian updating given E(x). Given these beliefs, we shall verify that E(x) is an equilibrium strategy profile.
At the communication stage, it suffices to check that Player 1 of type x and Player 2 of type k − x are indifferent between announcing y and n. Since in E(x) either the project is not completed or if the project is completed, Player 1 contributes x, Player 1 of type x receives a zero payoff whether she announces y or n. Likewise for type k − x of Player 2.
Strategies at the communication stage result one of four histories: (n, n), (n, y), (y, n) and (y, y), the two coordinates being the respective announcments of the two players. Following any history other than (y, y), the restriction of E(x) to the continuation game requires that neither player make a positive contribution. Given (1), this clearly constitutes (the strongly inefficient equilibrium) of the continuation game.
Following (y, y), the continuation game is C(F 1 ,F 2 ) whereF i is the truncation of
Given her beliefs, and the restriction of E(x) to this game, Player i knows that Player j will contribute x j for sure. Therefore it is clearly a best response for her to contribute x i = k − x j if her valuation is at least as high, which of course is as specified in E(x).
Lemma 4. Suppose (F 1 , F 2 ) is admissible. Conditional on at least one of the players reporting n at the communication stage, the project is never completed.
Proof of Lemma 4. LetF be the truncation of F to [a, b] a sub-interval of the original support. Letμ denote the pseudo-mode of the truncated distribution and µ, the pseudo-mode of the original distribution. The following simple facts are used in the proof.
Now let E be a strategy profile of some equilibrium where the probability that the project is completed is positive. Also for i = 1, 2 let x i be such that at the communication stage, Player i announces y only if her valuation is at least x i .
If Player i announces n, the posterior regarding her valuation, which we denote byF i , is the truncation of
On the other hand if the announcement were y, then the posterior isF i , which is the truncation of the original distribution to [x i , v i ]. Therefore, following the exchange of messages, the continuation game is C(G 1 , G 2 ) where G i is either F i orF i depending the player's announcement. We leave it to the reader to verify, using properties P1-P3, that whenever (F 1 , F 2 ) is admissible, the sum of the pseudo-modes of G 1 and G 2 is bounded above by k except when G i =F i and x i ≥ µ i for both i = 1, 2.
Therefore, unless (12) holds, by Proposition 2, the unique equilibrium of C * (G 1 , G 2 ) is strongly inefficient. This in particular implies that restriction of E to a continuation game when at least one player has said n, is necessarily the strongly inefficient equilibrium. We thus conclude that after any history other than (y, y), E requires that neither player make a positive contribution, which means the project will not be completed.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let E be an equilibrium strategy profile and let x i denote the cutoff at the communication stage. With no loss in generality assume that the project is completed with a positive probability in this equilibrium, which by Lemma 4 must occur only if both players announce y. From the proof of Lemma 4, we also know that x i ≥ µ i . (See (12) above.)
The continuation game following history (y, y) is C * (F 1 ,F 2 ). As x i ≥ µ i , we know that F i is concave. If x 1 + x 2 < k, by Proposition 3, the unique equilibrium of this game is again strongly inefficient leading to a contradiction that the project is completed with a positive probability. Therefore let x 1 + x 2 ≥ k.
Let q i (v i ) denote the probability that the project is completed conditional on the history being (y, y). Then using well known results for incentive compatible mechanisms, we have
Now let x = x 1 and consider E(x 1 ). The payoffs in this equilibrium are
An inspection of the formulas (13), (14) and (15) shows that U
Proof of Proposition 5. Given two numbers a and b such that k/2 < a < b < v, let E * denote the following strategy profile.
• In the communication stage a player announces y only if her type is at least a.
• After the history (n, n) neither player makes a contribution.
• If Player i has previously announced n and Player j has announced y, the former pays v and the latter pays k−v if her type is at least k−v (and zero otherwise).
• Following the history (y, y), a player contributes k/2 if her type is at least b and zero otherwise.
Under E(x), the equilibrium utility of Player 1 whose types lie between (v, x) and the types of Player 2 which lie in (v, k − x) obtain a zero payoff. Under E * however, the types between [v, a] of both players receive a positive payoff. Therefore it is impossible to dominate E * by a simple strategy profile. The proof is complete if we can establish that E * is an equilibrium strategy profile.
Take a We shall now verify that E * is an equilibrium strategy profile. We begin by verifying that it constitutes sequentially rational behavior at the contribution stage following each history. If the history is (n, n), according to E * neither player makes a contribution. This of course is the strongly inefficient equilibrium.
Consider the (y, n). The continuation game is C(F 1 ,F 2 ) where, by Bayes Rule, the posterior beliefsF 1 andF 2 are the truncation of F to [v, a] and [a, v] respectively. Given these beliefs Player 1 knows that Player 2 will contribute k − v for sure. For her to contribute v regardless of her type is clearly the optimal response. Similarly, Player 2 knows that Player 1 will contribute v regardless of her type. The best response of Player 2 is clearly to contribute k −v if her valuation is at least as high. A symmetric argument establishes that the restriction of E * to the following a history (n, y) is also sequentially optimal.
The continuation game following a history (y, y) is C(F ,F ) whereF is the truncation of F to the interval [a, v] . Player i believes that Player j will contribute k/2 if her type is at least b and zero otherwise. A best response of Player i is therefore to either contribute k/2 or zero depending on her type. If she contributes k/2 when her type is v, her payoff is
which, by the choice of b is non-negative if v ≥ b and zero otherwise. In other words, the restriction of E * to the contribution game following the history (y, y) is Bayesian equilibrium, given the posterior beliefs.
Finally to see that E * is a Bayesian equilibrium at the communication stage, it suffices to check that type a is indifferent between sending the message y and n at the announcement stage. When Player i of type a sends the message n, the project is completed only if the other player sends the message y which happens with probability (1 − F (a)). Conditional on this event, the project is completed with probability one with Player i contributing v. Therefore Player i's expected utility from reporting n is (1 − F (a))(a − v).
On the other hand, if she were to send the message y, then the project is completed only if 11 the other player reports n. Conditional on this event, the project is completed with probability one with Player i contributing k − v. In this case, her expected utility is F (a)(a + v − k), which by the definition of a is equal to the payoff from announcing n.
The following lemma identifies a couple of properties of regular distributions which are used in the proofs of Proposition 6 and Proposition 7.
Lemma 5. Let G(t) = (1 − F (t)) where F is a regular distribution. Then the following hold:
Moreover the function
in decreasing in x.
Proof. By assumption, G(·)/f (·) is decreasing. (19) must hold as its LHS of that inequality is merely the derivative of G(x)/f (x). (18) an be obtained by first multiplying and dividing the integrand on the LHS by f (t) and using the fact that G(t)/f (t) is decreasing. Finally, differentiate ψ(·) to get
Proof of Proposition 6. It suffices to show that W * i (·) has a unique maximum x * i and that
. A routine application of integration by parts shows that
Differentiating with respect to x gives us
The sign of W (x) depends on the difference between the two expressions in the square brackets. The value of the second expression is zero when x = k − v 2 , and since F 2 is regular, it is increasing to the right of k − v 2 . Differentiate the first term and use Eq. (18) note that the first term is decreasing in x. Its value is positive at x = v 1 , which is to the left of k − v 2 (by admissibility) only falls to zero at x = v 1 , which is to the right of k − v 2 . Therefore, these two have a unique intersection x * 1 . To the left of x * 1 , W 1 is positive and to its right W 1 is negative. Therefore x * 1 is the unique maximum of W 1 (·). Similarly, W 2 (·) also has a unique maximum, x * 2 . To prove that x * 1 < x * 2 , use (18) to note that
Now let x * denote the unique maximum of the expression
It may be verified that x * is well defined due to the fact that F 1 and F 2 are regular. It may also be verified that whenever x > x * , the expression in the square brackets of (22) is negative. Therefore whenever x ≥ x * , W 1 (x) < x is negative, which implies that x * 1 < x * . A similar argument shows that x * 2 > x * and hence x * 1 < x * 2 .
Proof of Proposition 7. As mentioned in the discussion leading to the statement of this Proposition, a socially efficient strategy must be the simple strategy E(x s ) where x s maximizes the expression B(x) = W 1 (x)+W 2 (x) where x lies in the interval [k −v 2 , v 1 ]. Using the expression for W i (·) given in (21), differentiate B(·) to get
where ψ(·) is as defined in (6). We have already shown in Lemma 5 that ψ(·) is a decreasing function. Moreover ψ i (v i ) = 0. Therefore there exists x s such that whenever x < x s , the expression in the square brackets of the above equation is positive if x < x s and is negative when x > x s and equals 0 when x = x s . Therefore x s , the unique maximum of B(·) is given by the condition ψ 1 (x s ) = ψ 2 (k − x s ).
Proof of Proposition 8. A communication strategy for a player can be described as a tuple (α, β, γ, δ) where the cutoff for reporting y is:
• α in the first round of communication,
• β (or γ) in the second round of communication if she has previously reported n (or correspondingly y) and the other player has reported y (or correspondingly n).
• δ if both report n in the first round.
Given a communication strategy (α, β, γ, δ), let F n and F y denote the truncation of F to the intervals [v, α] and [α, v] respectively. Following the first round of announcementes, there are four histories as before, {n, n}, {y, n}, {n, y} and {y, y}. It is useful to bear in mind that the continuation games following each of these histories is C * (F n , F n ), C * (F y , F n ), C * (F n , F y ) and C(F y , F y ).
Case 1 Consider an equilibrium of C 2 (F, F ) in which the communication strategy is such that α < k/2.
Following the history (y, n), the posterior is such that Player 2's valuation is at most α. Therefore the equilibrium payoff any type of Player 1 whose valuation is at most k − α is necessarily zero in the consquent game C * (F y , F n ) that follows these reports.
Moreover if α < µ, then the pseudomode of F y is also µ. If α > µ, the pseudomode of F y is in fact α. In either case, the unique equilibrium of C(F y , F y ), by Proposition 2 is for neither player to contribute. In other words all types of Player 1 receive payoff of zero in the continuation game following the history (y, y)
According to the equilibrium strategy, all those types of Player 1 whose valuations lie in the interval [α, k − α] report y. From the arguments of the preceeding two paragraphs, we know that the payoff of these types is zero, both when the other player reports y and n in the opening round. On the other hand, whenever v ∈ (α, k − α], her payoff under the socially efficient equilibrium strategy E(k/2) is (1 − F (k/2))(v − k/2) which is positive.
Case 2 Suppose the of C 2 (F, F ) is such that at the communication stage, α > k/2 and γ > k/2.
Our method of proof here is to argue that type α is strictly worse off relative to E(k/2). Continuity of the equilibrium payoffs in the overall game then imply that a positive measure of types sufficiently close to α are also strictly worse off.
Suppose Player 1 of type α reports y in the first round of communication. Her payoff from following this strategy is (1 − F (α))Π y + F (α)Π n where Π y and Π n refer to the payoff of type α in games consequent to the histories (y, y) and (y, n) respectively.
The continuation game following (y, y) is C(F y , F y ). Since α > k/2, the symmetric equilibrium of this game which yeilds a positive payoff to α is one in which each player contributes k/2 and the project is completed with probabilty one. Therefore Π y = (α − k/2).
The continuation game following (y, n) is C * (F y , F n ). In this game, α is the lowest type of Player 1. Note that (F y , F n ) does not satisfy admissibility. Proposition 4 cannot be readily applied. Yet, we leave it to the reader to verify the arguments presented in its proof are sufficient to to see that if Player 1 of type α were to receive a positive payoff, then 12 Π n = (1 − F n (k − γ))(α − γ).
From the arguments of the preceeding two paragraphs, the payoff of type α from reporting y is U y (γ) = (1 − F (α))(α − k/2) + F (α)(1 − F n (k − γ)) = (1 − F (α))(α − k/2) + (F (α) − F (k − γ))(α − γ) for some k −α ≤ γ ≤ α. Since F is concave to the right of k/2, the function U y (·) is decreasing to the right of k/2. Therefore if γ > k/2, then U y (γ)U y (k/2) = (1 − F (k/2))(α − k/2), which of course is the equilibrium payoff in the socially efficient equilibrium.
Case 3. Suppose the of C 2 (F, F ) is such that at the communication stage, α > k/2 and γ < k/2.
Note that α must be indifferent to reporting y and n. By calculating her expected payoff from reporting n, we shall show that γ < k/2 also leads to a lower payoff relative to the socially efficient equilibrium.
Suppose then that Player 1 of type α reports n in the first round of communication. Write her payoff from following this strategy as (1 − F (α))π y + F (α)π n where π y and and π n refer to the payoff of type α in the respective continuation game following a report of y and n by the other player.
The continuation game following (n, n) is C * (F n , F n ). Note that for this game, a symmetric interim efficient equilibrium of this game involves a simple strategy with the threshold k/2 leading to the concluation π n = (α − k/2).
The continuation game following (n, y) is C * (F n , F y ). This game is the same as C * (F y , F n ) discussed above with the role of Player 1 and Player 2 exchanged. Therefore 13 π y = (α − (k − γ)).
From the arguments of the preceeding two paragraphs, the payoff of type α from reporting n in the opening round is U n (γ) = (1 − F (α))(α − (k − γ)) + F (α)(1 − F n (k/2))(α − k/2) = (1 − F (α))(α − k − γ) + (F (α) − F (k/2))(α − k/2) Since γ < k/2, it is clear that U n (γ) < U n (k/2).
The only remaining case is when α > k/2 and γ = k/2. Even if such a configuration constitutes an equilibrium, it may be verified that it yields the same outcomes as E(k/2).
